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Farm	Shop’s	approach	was	primarily	a	conversion-franchising	model	where	existing	
independent	agro-dealer	shops	would	be	converted	into	Farm	Shop	branded	shops.	In	Kenya,	
the	norm	is	for	existing	agro	dealer	shops	to	be	operated	behind	metal	bars	where	customers	
can’t	browse	products,	see	prices	or	choose	between	various	product	offerings.		As	a	result,	a	
sense	of	distrust	between	farmers	and	shop	owners	is	generated.	Farmers	can’t	tell	by	looking	
if	feeds	have	fillers,	if	seeds	will	germinate	into	the	varieties	promised	or	if	animal	medicines	
are	legitimate.	Because	of	these	constraints	smallholder	farmers	face,	including	their	
vulnerability	to	the	climate	and	inability	to	reverse	purchasing	decisions,	building	trust	with	
farmers	was	essential	to	Farm	Shop’s	social	franchising	model.	One	way	this	was	achieved	
was	a	dramatically	different	shop	format	and	relationship	between	farmer-customers	and	
franchisee	business	owners.	Premises	were	open	to	allow	product	inspection	and	comparison,	
prices	were	clearly	labeled	on	all	products,	and	shop	owners	were	trained	to	provide	
information	to	farmers	on	selecting	products	that	would	best	meet	their	particular	needs.	All	
products	were	sourced	through	reputable	suppliers	to	guarantee	quality	and	authenticity	and	
shop	owners	and	their	shop	assistants	received	training	in	customers	care,	agricultural	
practices	and	animal	husbandry	so	they	could	help	farmers	make	the	best	choices	for	their	
livelihoods.		
	
In	2012,	Farm	Shop	converted	its	first	independent	agrodealers	to	Farm	Shops	with	
cofounder	Farouk	Jiwa	using	his	apartment	as	the	organizations	first	temporary	inventory	
warehouse.		Farm	Shop	more	or	less	doubled	its	number	of	shops	every	year	in	its	early	years,	
with	12	shops	in	2014	and	25	in	2015	and	48	in	2016.	As	Farm	Shop	grew,	increasing	
evidence	was	accumulating	that	the	open	shop	format,	quality	products,	informative	and	
helpful	service	model	introduced	by	Farm	Shop	was	benefitting	farmers	as	well	as	the	broader	
rural	entrepreneurial	ecosystem.	For	example,	other	local	agro-dealer	shops	began	to	copy	
the	open	shop	format	and	layout	of	Farm	Shops.	As	the	highest	form	of	recognition	of	Farm	
Shop’s	achievement,	a	competitor	entered	the	market	to	start	a	similar	franchise	network.		
	
As	Farm	Shop	grew	quickly	and	expanded	under	the	support	of	the	CIFSRF	implementation	
research	project,	it	worked	overtime	to	develop	information	systems	that	could	test	the	
fundamental	financial	assumptions	on	which	the	scalability	of	its	model	was	based.	
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Developing	the	accounting,	inventory	and	point-of-sale	systems	was	a	challenge	in	itself	as	the	
pieces	were	costly	and	complex	to	integrate	with	few	local	suppliers	able	to	provide	a	
comprehensive	solution.	However,	when	data	began	coming	in,	it	revealed	several	issues	with	
the	business	model	that	would	need	to	be	urgently	addressed	if	Farm	Shop	was	to	stay	on	a	
trajectory	toward	breakeven	and	scale:	
	
• Margins:	Farm	Shop	discovered	that	selling	agricultural	inputs	to	smallholder	farmers	
is	a	much	lower	margin	business	than	anticipated	with	average	margins	of	5	per	cent	
on	sales	over	all	products.	Animal	feed,	which	made	up	75	per	cent	of	Farm	Shop’s	
sales,	had	particularly	low	margins,	at	about	3.5	per	cent.	Suppliers	were	less	willing	
than	expected	to	give	discounts	even	at	the	volume	of	demand	generated	by	74	shops.	
The	existing	network	of	relationships	between	suppliers,	distributors,	wholesalers,	
sub-distributors	was	more	complex	and	difficult	to	disrupt	than	Farm	Shop	had	
anticipated.		
	
• Overheads:	Looking	at	the	numbers,	Farm	Shop	found	that	overheads	were	higher	
than	expected	due	to	the	startup	nature	of	the	organization	and	the	commitment	to	
many	direct	social	impact	activities	like	farmer	training.		
	
• Franchisee	Profitability:	Farm	Shop	also	found	that	fewer	of	its	franchisees	were	as	
profitable	as	anticipated.	In	some	cases,	opening	new	shops	were	costing	Farm	Shop	
more	than	were	generating	in	sales	margins	once	the	indirect	costs	of	marketing	and	
support	were	factored	in.	Supporting	all	franchisees	required	much	more	Farm	Shop	
staff	time	than	expected	and	despite	this,	the	franchise	failure	rate	remained	
stubbornly	high	at	10%	annually.	
	
The	data	coming	in	based	on	Farm	Shop’s	accounting	and	inventory	management	systems	
were	unequivocal.	Without	any	changes,	Farm	Shop	would	not	break	even	and	could	not	scale.	
Farouk,	Madison	and	their	senior	management	team	therefore	reacted	with	a	series	of	
strategies	to	increase	revenues	and	reduce	costs	to	get	the	organization	back	on	a	trajectory	
toward	breakeven	and	scale.		
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Increasing	Revenues		
• More	margins	from	existing	products.	Farm	Shop	needed	to	increase	its	margins.	
One	strategy	Farm	Shop	developed	included	selling	more	high-margin	products,	for	
example	hay	(25%	margin)	and	maize	bran	(10%	margin).	They	updated	their	
information	system	to	track	and	regularly	report	on	sales	margins	for	various	product	
categories	and	assigned	managers	targets	for	increasing	average	margins	on	different	
types	of	products.		
	
• New	revenue	streams.	Farm	Shop	also	began	to	explore	new	lines	of	business	that	
would	generate	additional	revenue	streams.	As	an	example	of	this,	day-old	chicks	were	
added	to	Farm	Shop’s	offerings	and	they	began	scanning	the	environment	for	other	
opportunities.		
	
• More	company-owned	stores.	Farm	Shop’s	original	business	concept	was	to	have	
franchisees	own	all	shops.	However,	after	a	few	franchisees	failed	to	operate	successful	
businesses	in	otherwise	promising	locations,	Farm	Shop	took	over	the	ownership	and	
management	of	six	of	these	shops	and	found	that	average	margins	it	could	earn	were	
about	6%	higher	than	in	franchisee	owned	shops.	Farm	Shop	began	to	look	more	
closely	at	how	they	could	increase	the	number	of	company-owned	shops	to	boost	their	
profitability.	
	
• Support	shop	success.	Given	the	mixed	success	of	initial	franchisees,	Farm	Shop	
developed	a	system	to	evaluate	the	quality	of	its	shop	owners	and	rank	them	into	
“gold”,	“silver”	and	“bronze”	categories	according	to	their	performance.	“Gold”	
franchisees	were	rewarded	with	greater	eligibility	to	access	financing	and	participate	
in	pilot	projects	testing	new	ideas.	“Silver”	and	“bronze”	franchisees	were	supported	
with	targeted	interventions	wherever	possible	to	address	weaknesses	and	optimize	
business	profitability.				
	
Reducing	Costs	
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• Separate	for-profit	and	not-for-profit	activities.	A	main	strategy	to	reduce	Farm	
Shop’s	business	operating	costs	was	for	Farm	Shop	to	separate	activities	into	those	
managed	by	Farm	Shop	retail	(a	for-profit	organization)	and	those	managed	by	Farm	
Shop	NGO	(a	separate	not-for-profit	organization).	By	separating	activities	between	
the	two	organizational	entities,	Farm	Shop	aims	to	reduce	the	costs	to	Farm	Shop	retail	
of	the	farmer	training,	research	and	development,	and	impact	measurement	functions,	
which	will	be	funded	through	Farm	Shop	NGO.	
	
• Optimize	supply	chain	efficiencies.	Farm	Shop	brought	forward	a	number	of	
strategies	to	reduce	costs	through	achieving	greater	efficiencies	in	its	supply	chain	
from	suppliers	to	franchisees.	Importantly,	Farm	Shop	hired	an	experienced	new	CEO	
with	a	background	in	distribution,	supply	chain	and	logistics	management	with	a	
mandate	to	bring	Farm	Shop	in	line	with	best	practices	in	retail	franchise	operations.	
Activities	being	implemented	include	optimizing	warehouse	space	and	truck	delivery	
routes,	increasing	direct	purchasing	from	manufacturers	(rather	than	wholesalers)	and	
continually	assessing	market	prices	to	ensure	competitiveness	while	working	towards	
reducing	costs	and	increasing	product	margins.		
	
• Close	unprofitable	shops.	Although	many	Farm	Shop	franchisees	were	profitable,	a	
number	have	struggled,	despite	training	and	consistent	hands-on	support	from	Farm	
Shop	staff.	One	of	the	most	significant	problems	is	when	franchisees	find	themselves	
unable	to	reinvest	profits	into	inventory,	leading	to	a	downward	spiral	in	product	
availability,	customer	satisfaction	and	profitability.	Closing	the	shops	that	are	
unprofitable,	despite	best	efforts,	is	reducing	the	drain	on	Farm	Shops	resources	and	
allows	staff	to	support	the	more	successful	shops	which	create	a	virtuous	cycle	of	
income	generation	and	serving	smallholder	farmers	with	the	inputs	and	information	
they	need.		
	
After	several	months	of	putting	its	new	strategies	in	place	to	reduce	costs	and	increase	
revenues,	Farouk,	Madison	and	the	research	team	recalculated	Farm	Shop’s	trajectory	with	
the	help	of	a	specially	tailored	financial	model.	Based	on	a	number	of	assumptions	about	how	
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the	future	will	unfold,	projections	are	that	Farm	Shop	should	now	be	able	to	break	even	at	
about	500	shops.	Given	its	intensive	journey	on	the	path	to	scale	so	far,	dealing	with	the	issues	
so	central	to	the	success	of	all	social	franchises,	Farm	Shop	has	identified	two	overarching	
lessons	learned	for	scaling	a	social	franchise.	
	
Lesson	1:	A	business	model	needs	to	be	developed	and	validated	before	being	scaled.	If	
each	new	shop	opened	costs	the	franchising	network	more	than	it	generates,	the	system	will	
scale	itself	out	of	business.	Social	franchises	like	Farm	Shop	operate	in	contexts	with	a	lot	of	
uncertainty	–	uncertainty	about	farmer,	franchisee,	supplier	and	competitor	behaviour	and	
preferences.	In	the	early	stages	of	launching	and	building	a	new	venture,	many	assumptions	
act	as	placeholders	until	they	can	be	validated.	The	path	to	scale	can	be	seen	as	a	continual	
process	of	making	assumptions	and	learning	whether	they	are	true	or	not	and	continually	
adjusting	based	on	feedback	and	data	from	experience	in	the	market.	As	a	Farm	Shop	board	
member	stated,	“One	of	the	things	we	have	been	promoting	at	Farm	Shop	is	that	all	staff	
understand	that	we’re	on	a	journey,	we’re	discovering	new	things,	that	we	don’t	know	the	
answers.”	Fundamentally,	before	an	organization	can	scale,	it	needs	to	validate	the	financial	
assumptions	underlying	its	business	model	and	establish	a	clear	path	to	profitability	and	
scale.		
	
Lesson	2:	To	develop	a	scalable	business	model,	cost	effectively	gathering	the	right	data	
to	validate	key	assumptions	is	essential.		
Data	collection	and	management	systems	are	essential	to	achieving	scale	as	they	need	to	be	
used	to	gather	the	information	that	will	test	financial	assumptions	and	validate	elements	of	
the	business	model.	One	of	Farm	Shop’s	lessons	is	that	organizations	in	the	early	stage	of	
development	face	challenging	choices	with	respect	to	designing	and	investing	in	data	systems.	
A	first	challenge	is	that	developing	these	information	systems	are	costly	in	terms	of	time	and	
money.	The	second	challenge	is	that	in	the	early	stages	of	business	model	development	and	
iteration	its	not	always	clear	what	the	most	important	data	points	are	to	measure.	As	a	board	
member	explained,	“We	need	the	data	systems	and	IT	systems	in	place	to	source	relatively	
accurate	data.	We	were	making	a	lot	of	assumptions	based	on	imperfect	data.	To	some	degree	
that’s	fine	–	most	start-ups	and	growing	organizations	have	an	issue	with	imperfect	data	
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because	it	costs	an	extraordinary	amount	to	get	perfect	data.	As	you	grow	and	evolve	–	the	
other	problem	is	–	you’re	not	even	sure	what	data	you	need.	A	lot	of	the	underlying	numbers,	
we	didn’t	realize	we	needed	these,	or	that	these	were	critical	numbers;	we	had	to	
fundamentally	change	them	over	time	as	we	analyzed	which	data	points	were	really	critical	
and	which	were	not.”		Without	accurate	and	timely	data,	the	fundamentals	of	the	business	
model	cannot	be	tested	and	validated,	which	is	an	essential	step	on	the	path	to	scale.		
	
Conclusion	
Farm	Shop	is	one	of	the	cohort	of	pioneering	social	franchises	that	have	applied	the	principles	
of	franchising	to	address	a	particular	social	need	–	in	this	case,	the	prosperity,	food	security	
and	livelihoods	of	smallholder	farmers.	Like	others	experimenting	with	social	franchising,	
Farm	Shop	has	faced	the	hard	work	of	developing	a	business	model	that	could	generate	
sufficient	revenues	to	cover	overhead	costs	and	allow	the	network	to	break	even	and	scale	
through	market	forces.	On	this	journey,	Farm	Shop	uncovered	important	lessons	relevant	for	
all	social	franchises	at	similar	stages	in	the	business	model	development	process:	make	sure	
your	financial	model	has	been	validated	before	embarking	on	scale,	and	do	everything	
possible	to	gather	the	business	and	financial	data	you	need	to	test	the	model.	With	these	
lessons	in	mind,	Farm	Shop	and	other	social	franchises	can	be	even	better	equipped	to	live	up	
to	social	franchising’s	promise	of	achieving	social	objectives	in	a	more	resource	efficient	and	
sustainable	way.		
	
